

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 NEA-10 AF-10 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00

USIE-00 USSS-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

ACDA-19 IO-14 SAJ-01 INRE-00 MC-02 DRC-01 EURE-00

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S E C R E T USNATO 4919

E.O. 11652: GDS, 12-31-81

TAGS: PBOR, MOPS, XF, NATO

SUBJECT: NATO IMPLICATIONS OF THE MIDDLE-EAST CONFLICT

REF: A) USNATO 4909, B) USNATO 4843, C) USNATO 4787

D) STATE 203685, E) STATE 203698

SUMMARY: SYG LUNS HAS CALLED RESTRICTED AND UNPUBLICIZED COUNCIL MEETING FOR 11:00 AM OCTOBER 16 TO DISCUSS, ON AN INSTRUCTED BASIS, NATO IMPLICATIONS OF THE MIDDLE-EAST CONFLICT, SPECIFICALLY:

A) THE CHANCES OF EXTENSION OR ESCALATION OF THE CONFLICT AND THE EFFECT ON ALLIED COUNTRIES; AND

B) THE EFFECTS OF THE WAR ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS, PARTICULARLY ON "DETENTE." ACTION REQUESTED: GUIDANCE, TOGETHER WITH AUTHORIZATION TO DRAW UPON REF D IN ADVANCE OF WASHINGTON PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF U.S. DECISION TO MOUNT MILITARY RE-SUPPLY OPERATION TO ISRAEL. END SUMMARY.

1. AT SPECIAL MEETING OF POLADS OCTOBER 15, CHAIRMAN KASTL  
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REFERRED TO SACEUR MESSAGE TO MC CHAIRMAN IN WHICH GENERAL GOODPASTER POINTED TO SPREADING EFFECTS OF THE MIDDLE-EAST SITUATION AND REQUESTED AN URGENT OVERALL POLITICAL APPRAISAL OF THE SITUATION WHICH EMPHASIZED THE

RANGE OF IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO GENERALLY AND THE ALLIED  
COMMAND EUROPE SPECIFICALLY.

2. KASTL SAID THAT IN RESPONSE TO THIS REQUEST SYG LUNS  
HAD CALLED RESTRICTED SESSION OF THE COUNCIL ON OCTOBER 16  
AT WHICH LUNS HOPED PERMREPS WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE  
FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ON AN INSTRUCTED BASIS:

A) THE CHANCES OF EXTENSION OR ESCALATION OF THE  
MIDDLE-EAST CONFLICT AND THE EFFECTS OF SUCH EXTENSION OR  
ESCALATION ON INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES OF THE ALLIANCE AND ON THE  
ALLIANCE COLLECTIVELY;

B) THE EFFECT OF THE MIDDLE-EAST CONFLICT ON EAST-WEST  
RELATIONS, PARTICULARLY ON "DETENTE"; AND

C) A REVIEW OF THE OIL SUPPLY SITUATION AS IT STANDS NOW  
AND AS IT MIGHT BE PROJECTED IF THE MIDDLE-EAST CONFLICT IS  
PROTRACTED.

3. WITH REGARD TO QUESTION (C), KASTL SAID THAT A NATO STUDY  
WILL BE CIRCULATED ON THE 15TH OR 16TH WHICH WILL PROVIDE MUCH  
OF THIS INFORMATION. KASTL SAID THE EMPHASIS OF TOMORROW'S  
COUNCIL MEETING SHOULD THEREFORE BE ON TOPICS (A) AND (B).

4. KASTL SPECULATED THAT THE COUNCIL MIGHT DECIDE ON A ROLE  
FOR POLADS IN ON-GOING DISCUSSION OF THESE MIDDLE-EAST  
SUBJECTS. HE REFERRED TO THE MANNER IN WHICH POLADS  
OPERATED DURING THE CZECH CRISIS OF 1968 ALTHOUGH HE NOTED THE  
TWO SITUATIONS WERE DIFFERENT. KASTL THOUGHT THAT IN THE PRESENT  
MIDDLE-EAST SITUATION A POLADS CHAIRMAN'S REPORT TO THE SYG,  
RATHER THAN AN AGREED POLADS REPORT TO THE COUNCIL, MIGHT BE  
IN ORDER. LUNS COULD THEN TRANSMIT THIS REPORT TO MC UNDER A PO.

5. KASTL ASKED IF ANY MEMBERS WISHED TO DISCUSS SUBSTANTIVE  
MIDDLE-EAST DEVELOPMENTS TODAY. TURKISH REP INDICATED HE HAD  
READ THAT BOTH THE U.S. AND USSR WERE NOW TALKING ABOUT  
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POSSIBILITIES OF ORGANIZING A CEASE-FIRE IN PLACE. THE  
TURKISH REP INQUIRED IF THE U.S. REP HAD ANY INFORMATION.  
THE U.S. REP REFERRED TO FULL WIRELESS FILE TEXT OF SECRETARY  
KISSINGER'S OCTOBER 12 PRESS CONFERENCE WHICH HAD BEEN  
DISTRIBUTED TO ALL DELEGATIONS.

6. CANADIAN AND UK REPS QUESTIONED TO WHAT EXTENT THE COUNCIL  
COULD DISCUSS THE ASSIGNED SUBJECTS IN A MEANINGFUL WAY GIVEN  
THE LACK OF AUTHORITATIVE MILITARY ASSESSMENTS. THE CHAIRMAN  
REFERRED TO A PROGRAM OF MILITARY BRIEFINGS FOR PERMREPS WHICH  
WAS GOING INTO EFFECT IMMEDIATELY.

7. COMMENT: THERE ARE TWO ASPECTS TO THIS CALL FOR A COUNCIL

DISCUSSION AND POLITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE MIDDLE-EAST CONFLICT. FIRST, THERE IS NATURAL AND JUSTIFIED CONCERN ON THE PART OF MILITARY COMMANDERS AND INDIVIDUAL ALLIED NATIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE SEEMS TO BE A CERTAIN THRUST GENERATED BY LUNS AS TO THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF NATO IN THE EVOLVING MIDDLE-EAST CRISIS. SOME OF OUR IS CONTACTS BELIEVE THAT A FULL COUNCIL DEBATE ON THE MIDDLE-EAST CRISIS, PARTICULARLY ONE WHICH MIGHT SEEK TO ARRIVE AT A CONSENSUS, IS LIKELY TO BE AN UNPRODUCTIVE AFFAIR SINCE THERE ARE BOUND TO BE OBJECTIONS FROM FRANCE, POSSIBLY FROM THE U.S. AND OTHERS TO SUCH AN EXERCISE. IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT KASTL IS SPEAKING IN TERMS OF A CHAIRMAN'S REPORT RATHER THAN AN AGREED POLADS REPORT TO THE COUNCIL. ACTION REQUESTED: I BELIEVE U.S. SHOULD ADOPT FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE AND PROVIDE LEADERSHIP IN COUNCIL DISCUSSION TOMORROW AND BEYOND. THIS WOULD HELP THE U.S. TO GUIDE NATO DISCUSSIONS, INFLUENCE THINKING IN ALLIED CAPITALS AND SHAPE, AND SPECIFICALLY THE ASSESSMENT SACEUR HAS REQUESTED. WE WILL NEED GUIDANCE BEFORE TOMORROW'S MEETING (SEE REFTELS). IF WE REPORT THAT WE ARE WITHOUT GUIDANCE, THAT FACT COULD EXACERBATE SUSPICIONS ABOUT U.S.-SOVIET DEALINGS ON WHICH THE ALLIANCE IS INTENTIONALLY BEING KEPT UNINFORMED. I ALSO REQUEST AUTHORIZATION TO DRAW UPON STATE 203685 TO INFORM COUNCIL BEFORE PUBLIC CONFIRMATION IN WASHINGTON OF U.S. DECISION TO RE-SUPPLY ISRAEL.

RUMSFELD

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